Energy is becoming more and more important to state survival and economic development, and is increasingly considered an issue of Ônational securityÕ. In 2005, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)Õs bid for US energy company Unocal was securitised by US elite actors, who called for presidential action on the grounds of Ônational securityÕ. This paper argues that securitisation of energy is problematic, as it impedes cooperation and encourages strategic and/or economic competition between states over energy supplies by tying energy to a national security Ôus vs themÕ scenario. Moreover, it limits the energy security debate. This paper will use a securitisation approach to analyse the discourse of the Unocal Affair, together with a smaller complementary case study of US-China cooperation on shale gas to show the possibility of dealing with energy in desecuritised terms. It argues that the current literature on energy ÔsecurityÕ analyses policy in overly simplistic competition/cooperation terms and fails to recognise the policy implications of securitising energy. In contrast, a securitisation approach to energy can explain the (re)presentation of energy as a policy issue and allows an analysis of how using particular discourse makes particular policy possible, while silencing alternative policy options. This has implications for policy-making in this area as energy policy/practice should be desecuritised.
being successfully securitised in US-China relations 4 . Limiting security to national security in practice also limits the energy security debate, overlooking insecurities caused by state pursuit of secure energy supplies on the local and the international levels, including human and environmental security 5 . This paper suggests desecuritisation as a possible solution to this problem. Moving energy out of the ÔhighÕ politics of national security would both make cooperation more likely as energy ÔsecurityÕ would no longer be framed in us/them terms, and open up the debate on policy alternatives. This paper uses US-China relations as an empirical case study to illustrate this argument. Not only are they the dominant powers in the current international system and the two largest consumers of energy globally, they are also key importers of energy 6 . Consequently, energy is particularly important in their respective foreign policies, and often causes tension in bilateral relations. This has made them the focus of much of the current academic literature on energy security, and a useful case study for this paper. Overall, both states view energy largely in national security terms, though full securitisation of energy has not been successful before 2005 . While broadly equated with national security, full and successful securitisation requires both a particular rhetorical structure and a sense of urgency, combined with a suitable external and discursive context to ensure audience acceptance of the designation of the security threat 7 . While the relationship has seen many securitising moves before, full successful securitisation has not occurred in energy relations between the US and China before Unocal. As a result, this paper uses CNOOCs 2005 bid for Unocal as a case study to illustrate the problems of securitising energy in US-China relations, and to put forward an argument for desecuritising energy.
The paper begins with a selective review of the existing energy security literature focused on the relationship between the US and China, dividing it into two theoretical camps viewing energy security either in strategic or market terms. It then presents an ontological and normative critique of this literature, outlining how de/securitisation theory can make a significant contribution to the energy debate. The main body of the paper applies the theory empirically via the case study of the Unocal affair, setting out the political and academic context of what occurred and examining official and non-official documents relevant to the process of securitisation. It then considers the policy implications of securitisation in the Unocal affair. Lastly, it makes a case for desecuritising energy, illustrating this with several examples, including US-China cooperation on shale gas, showing the possibility of dealing with energy supply issues in bilateral relations outside of the ÔsecurityÕ realm. 4 The conceptual framework of the analysis in this paper is rooted in securitisation theory, the central argument of which is that labelling something a ÔsecurityÕ issue impacts on policy and how that issue is dealt with. As such, the invocation of ÔsecurityÕ is a Ôspeech-actÕ (Ole W¾ver, ÔSecuritization and de-securitizationÕ in On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia UP, 1995), 55) used to legitimate lifting an issue above normal politics into the sphere of security and extraordinary measures (Barry Buzan et al, Security (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 26) . 5 The emphasis on national security works to prioritise the energy supply needs of the state, which all too often leads to a heavy emphasis on fossil fuel production and consumption Ð particularly in the American case. Such energy consumption is a huge contributor to climate change, causing both human and environmental insecurity. Dannreuther goes as far as suggesting that energy security as currently understood is ÔincompatibleÕ with climate security (see footnote 10). 6 insights 20 . Nevertheless, the language used by these scholars continues to fall back on a binary understanding of energy security as defined by either national cooperation or competition, retaining a state-centric understanding of security and taking scant interest in the role discourse itself plays in making particular policy possible.
This debate over national competition versus cooperation, which dominates the literature, provides too narrow an analytical basis for understanding this important issue fully. The critique presented here is twofold, ontological and normative. Firstly, I posit that energy security is constituted and contingent, rather than an objectively identifiable goal 21 . In the existing literature, ÔthreatsÕ to energy security are defined in a way that implies objectivity in the designation, with negligible analysis given over to the process by which threats are socially constructed 22 , and particular policy courses are made possible by means of the legitimacy created through the use of securititised discourse. Both competition and cooperation, whether economic or strategic, are presented as ÔnaturalÕ 23 , thus excluding from the outset any genuine possibility of change. This paper argues that, on the contrary, such static conception of our social environment is problematic, and to the extent that it provides an accurate account of behaviour, this is less the result of its accurate representation of natural order than it is the triumph of self-fulfilling prophecy 24 . This leads onto the normative critique. Both sides of the debate implicitly present a conventional view of security whereby something is a security issue because it threatens the economic or political survival of the state. However, while energy ÔsecurityÕ may be a threat to the wellbeing of the state, actions which flow from the stateÕs pursuit of its energy security can themselves present serious threats both to human security and the survival of the ecosystem. The presently prevailing definition of energy security is fundamentally incompatible with climate security 25 , and thus the argument presented here is that that definition needs to be re-examined. Moreover, limiting the conception of security to national security perpetuates an ÔusÕ/ÔthemÕ understanding of security, in practice encouraging competition over energy in strategic and/or economic terms. This paper broadly follows a critical geopolitical approach, problematising Ôinvocations of dangers in political discourseÕ 26 , on the basis of the conviction that (in)security and threats are Ôdiscursive constructions rather than natural factsÕ 27 . Analysing energy security using securitisation theory helps highlight this, and allows this paper to address the ontological and normative critiques presented in the previous section. Securitisation is the discursive process by which Ôan issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thusÉan agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary meansÕ 28 . It requires Ôa process of articulationsÕ, known as security Ôspeech-actsÕ 29 . It is distinguished by a particular rhetorical structure, emphasising survival, urgency and Ôpriority of actionÕ 30 . The reverse process is desecuritisation. Because of the connotations and history of ÔsecurityÕ securitising an issue inevitably Ôevokes an image of threat-defense, allocating to the state an important role in addressing itÕ 31 . Securitisation theory has been applied to a wide range of topics, though there has been a lack of empirical securitisation analyses of energy 32 . This may be partly because of the difficulty in applying securitisation theory to a field which has gradually become considered an accepted part of the security agenda in both the US and China 33 , with rising importance to state survival. For example, the US has had an international energy advisor on the National Security Council since 2003. This is why the Unocal affair makes a particularly good case study, as it allows a clear empirical analysis of a successful securitisation, with policy implications in both the US and China. While there has been much conceptual revisionism of securitisation theory, this cannot be dealt with in detail here 34 . However, it is worth noting the importance of the external context and the role of the audience as key factors for securitisation to be successful 35 , which is of particular relevance to the case of energy because of the looming reality of Ôpeak oilÕ and gradual inclusion of energy in the security agenda.
While securitisation theory allows this paper to address the ontological critique of the existing literature to show that energy security is constituted and contingent, the normative silence in securitisation is often criticised. This is partly due to the underdeveloped nature of desecuritisation 36 by the original authors, who left the normative choice between securitisation and desecuritisation to the researcher to determine according to context; allowing this paper to address the normative critique of the existing energy security literature by suggesting desecuritisation as a possibility for change. Viewing security as discourse, a state labelling something a threat to security Ôenables certain political processes and policiesÕ 37 . Policy (in)security discourses are closely tied to conventional understandings of security; Ôthese links serve to prescribe certain policy responses and proscribe othersÕ 38 . In US-China relations, the securitisation of energy reinforces state-centric understandings of security in problematic ways. It reproduces the dominant discourse, focused on rival logics of 29 Ibid., 377. 30 state competition and state cooperation, and reinforces the present tendency towards national security-focused behaviour. If discourse could be shifted in such a way as to return the issue to Ôthe normal bargaining processes of the political sphereÕ 39 it could be dealt with much more constructively, and space be opened for reflection upon the impact of the current Ônational securityÕ discourse on environmental and individual security. Problematically, there is a lack of research on desecuritisation in practice, and while advocating desecuritisation of energy, the substantive focus here is on demonstrating the problems of securitising energy; a thorough examination of how desecuritisation of energy might occur in practice is left for future research. However, using the lens of desecuritisation this paper can put forward a possible solution to the normative critique identified with the energy security literature, presenting a possibility for change by desecuritising the policy discourse surrounding energy, in order to better deal with energy concerns beyond the state, and their impact on individuals and the environment 40 .
It is important to briefly clarify the differences between desecuritisation and the traditional liberal approach. While the goals of the traditional liberal approach and desecuritisation as used in this paper are similar, as they both aim for improved cooperation on energy, they differ both in their positions on how to achieve those goals, and in their underlying conception of threat and security. The liberal energy security discourse present in policy circles derives from a particular branch of liberal discourse which encourages cooperation, but retains a state-centric understanding of security, focusing on cooperation as a means to national economic gain, encouraging economic competition between states over energy resources while ignoring the impact this has on individuals and the environment. This discourse is clearly visible in ChinaÕs response to US securitisation. Meanwhile, as stated in the ontological critique presented earlier, like the realist approach the liberal discourse on energy security fails to recognise the constituted nature of energy security, and the role of discourse and action in both making particular policy possible and as an avenue for change. Thus while both approaches advocate cooperation, the liberal literature does not provide any real suggestions for getting there in practice, beyond suggesting the US and China cooperate on energy security. Desecuritisation would involve moving energy out of the security sphere 41 , away from a state-centric national security us/them paradigm, to make cooperation more likely. It is in this way that desecuritisation allows this approach to move beyond traditional energy security discourses 42 .
The framework of (de)securitisation has distinct advantages for the study of energy, showing how using a particular discourse of Ôenergy securityÕ makes very particular policy possible, highlighting the problems with securitising energy and providing an alternative. Consequently it serves as the primary theoretical lens through which to examine the case study which follows. This paper analyses the discourse in documents produced by both sides 43 , focusing on the US as the primary site of securitisation. It has used selective sampling to analyse key official documents and newspaper articles, primarily from June-July 2005. The analysis looks at the rhetorical structure of securitisation, to show how what could be regarded as a purely commercial exchange was dramatised and labelled a security issue. It also analyses the presentation of agency in the discourse presented, and the construction of China as that which is ÔOtherÕ to the US to produce the idea of the ÔChina threatÕ. The role of the securitiser is emphasised, in particular the added legitimacy of elite actors in securitisation. The analysis also uses relevant media statements on the case study to show the interplay of official and non-official discourses to complement the analysis of securitisation to reflect this. It begins by discussing the wider context of US-China relations and the Unocal affair to show how this facilitated securitisation, before discussing existing academic analyses of the situation. It then looks directly at the discourse of the Unocal affair, analysing key documents and briefly illustrating Chinese attempts to induce cooperation by reframing the debate in liberal/market terms. Lastly, it looks at the policy implications and the effect on US-China relations.
The Unocal Affair
Political and academic background: the discursive context US-China relations have become increasingly complicated in the last twenty years with the economic rise of China, and energy relations between the US and China need to be understood in a wider discursive context of geopolitical rivalry and economic interdependence.
While the US and China are economically integrated and cooperate in international organisations and through a number of bilateral initiatives and dialogues, relations between the two states are coloured by Chinese mistrust of Ôthe WestÕ and US construction of China as a threat. Beeson argues there are clear similarities between Chinese and American strategic thinking, pointing to realist, zero-sum tendencies in both states towards each other 44 . The USChina Economic and Security Review Commission shows US official discourse constructing China as a threat to US interests: ÔChina will seek to displace the worldÕs leading powers, namely the United StatesÕ 45 Ònational interestÓ as central in governing its foreign and security policy-makingÕ 47 . These are not the only discourses present, as noted before liberal voices are also present in policy circles in both states, including attempts to shift away from the ÔChina threatÕ discourse in the US, but overall they remain an important influence on bilateral relations.
US-China relations are often tense and realist norms and discourses in both states often emphasise worst-case scenarios which has led to ÔUS unilateralism, hectoring and demands coupled with Chinese nationalism and exclusion from a major role from the international financial institutionsÕ 48 . Both states have clear competing discourses more broadly as well as in the case of the Unocal affair, emphasising economic interdependence, reliance on markets and cooperation. Cooperation and dialogue between the two has been notable during the global economic crisis; still, Ôhard-liners in both capitals seek to reduce US-China interdependence, seeing such interdependence as an intolerable vulnerabilityÕ 49 . Overall the relationship between the US and China is one of complex interdependence, which, like energy relations more broadly, tends to be discursively cast in competition/cooperation terms.
Chinese energy policy in particular is often constructed as a threat in US discourse. Because continuing economic growth is necessary for the Chinese Communist PartyÕs political legitimacy, continued energy security is essential 50 and ChinaÕs energy policy is Ôalready a source of tension in bilateral relationsÕ 51 . The Chinese leadership has clear concerns about energy security which the state-owned oil companies have used to their advantage in harnessing state support for upstream investment policies, commercial diplomacy and goingout deals. The Chinese government have considered energy a security issue for some time, with the military discussing energy supply and security in military terms as early as 2002 52 . However, there is also a clear competing, liberal discourse in China, emphasising market mechanisms, interdependence, cooperation, diversification of energy supplies and sources as strategies to enhance ChinaÕs energy security.
Moving onto the Unocal affair more specifically, Jiang provides an excellent overview of the political context, pointing to the ÔsensitiveÕ nature of US-China relations at the time of the CNOOC bid. It came at a time of US focus on ChinaÕs rapid military modernisation and increasing US pressure on China to revalue its currency in the light of increasing US trade deficit 53 . This was accompanied by the US imposition of duties ÔÉon a range of Chinese textile productsÕ:
No wonder when CNOOC, 71 percent controlled by the Chinese government, made a Ôfriendly mergerÕ offer to the 9th ranking U.S. energy firm Unocal, American politicians and the public in general reacted as if a Ôred stormÕ was coming to the U. The reality of the political and discursive context of US-China relations in June-July 2005 acted to facilitate and even encourage securitisation in the US.
The few academic studies conducted of the Unocal affair all come from a conventional energy security perspective, and tend to emphasise the ÔnaturalÕ, ÔinevitableÕ nature of what evolved. It was said to show the US and China as intently focused Ôon their national energy securityÕ and a tendency Ôto assume the worst of the otherÕs intentionsÕ 55 . JiangÕs case study of the Unocal affair presents it as a Ôreflection of BeijingÕs growing energy insecurity syndromeÕ 56 . US politicians and political discourses emphasised the threat, and media referred to the Ôred stormÕ ahead 57 . In contrast, Chinese media Ôquestioned the way in which US politicians measured ChinaÕs threat to their national securityÕ, in particular as Unocal Ôaccounted for less than 1 percent of the total US energy supplyÕ 58 . Many saw the Congressional intervention as US containment of ChinaÕs rise 59 , viewing the failed bid as Ôrepresenting an America that bends over backwards to deny Chinese access to energy resourcesÕ 60 .
In practice, there was a duality of discourse in both states, with voices speaking out for and against securitisation. Overall, US official discourse tended more towards a strategic approach, and Chinese discourse more towards a market approach, keeping the sale of Unocal off the security agenda by emphasising it as a Ôcorporate commercial offerÕ 61 . The focus here is on the US discourse as the site of securitisation, but Chinese attempts to reframe the debate in market terms will also be discussed. However, it is important to briefly recognise the competing discourses, found in both states, though more visible in the US due to the practice of censorship in China. There were voices in the US arguing the sale of Unocal was not a national security issue 62 . It is also visible in some media articles and the testimony of Jerry Taylor submitted to the House Armed Services Committee on Unocal, which clearly stated that US fears were Ôill foundedÕ 63 . Likewise in China, particularly in new media like blogs and online forums, securitised discourse could be found.
The discourse of the Unocal Affair
Securitisation primarily took place in the US, as has been outlined. This was lead by some key figures and committees: two Congressmen, Richard Pombo and Duncan Hunter, the USChina Security and Economic Review Commission (USCC), and the House Armed Services Committee. As elite actors they were in a prime position to securitise the Unocal affair. Overall the discourse emphasised the difference between US and Chinese oil strategies:
oil at the point of production. These different energy policies could bring both countriesÕ energy interests into conflict 64 This also sets up the US and China in opposition, using binary liberal/realist energy security discourse. The US is defined as taking a liberal, market approach, and China as the opposite.
The initial securitising move was made by Congressmen Hunter and Pombo, who sent a letter to the White House on June 17 2005 urging President Bush to consider the national security implications of the CNOOC bid. The letter was widely reported in the media 65 , and the letter itself stated that:
Ésuch an acquisition raises many concerns about U.S. jobs, energy production and energy securityÉWe fear that American companies will find it increasingly difficult to compete against China's state-owned and/or controlled energy companies 66 It also added:
We believe that it is critical to understand the implications for American interests and most especially, the threat posed by China's governmental pursuit of world energy resources. The United States increasingly needs to view meeting its energy requirements within the context of our foreign policy, national security and economic security agenda. This is especially the case with China 67 The discourse in this letter clearly shows the beginning of the rhetoric of securitisation which later became even more explicit, and it goes on to emphasise the threat more directly. Words like ÔcriticalÕ are used to emphasise the priority and need for urgency, while the emphasis on Chinese government involvement in the energy sector is used to highlight the threat. The focus on ÔAmerican interestsÕ suggests a realist conception of the international system, where the ÔChina threatÕ has Ôimplications for American interestsÕ. The penultimate sentence makes clear the need to securitise energy, and highlights the need to go beyond the established rules of the game, in this case by placing energy in the context of national security. Likewise, the singling out of China emphasised by the word ÔespeciallyÕ in the last sentence sets China up as a particular threat. ChinaÕs energy policy, while deemed ÔunderstandableÕ, is also referred to as ÔaggressiveÕ in the letter.
The coming entrenchment of securitisation can be seen in House of Representatives Resolution 344 (H.Res.344), and the debates preceding it on 30 June 2005. The debates show statements like Ônational security has to include economic securityÕ; Ôa Chinese government acquisition of a critical United States energy company could impair our national securityÕ. UnocalÕs importance is clearly exaggerated here, its worldwide operations provide 0.2 percent of global oil production 68 and it is not near the top of the list of key US suppliers 69 .
The use of the inclusive ÔourÕ national security shows an attempt to show how the nature of the threat is such that it will affect everyone, to justify going beyond normal established rules. Ultimately, Ô[t]his acquisition could mean less energy for the United StatesÕ 70 . This clearly shows a zero-sum attitude to energy. The repetition of ÔsecurityÕ and Ônational securityÕ in these debates work as security speech-acts, by more than one actor, and are reproductive of a particular conception of sovereignty and security. While these securitising speech-acts are intermingled with a few statements to the opposite effect, largely emphasising free trade, these voices are silenced in the resulting resolution in favour of the national security discourse, when H.Res.344 passed by 398 to 15 on 30 June 2005.
H.Res.344 was a non-binding resolution 71 , calling for a presidential review of the bid on the basis of Ônational securityÕ. Overall the tone is declarative, declaring statements as true and not subject to questioning. It presents a particular view of reality as black and white; this is a threat to national security and must be dealt with. Securitisation is clearly intentional, and the position of the securitising agent(s), the House of Representatives, is privileged as an elite agent likely to be considered legitimate by the population. The discourse is securitised, emphasising urgency, threat and priority. Its definitive nature and declarative tone allows no discursive room for arguments to the contrary. In the resolution itself, all objections are silenced.
The discursive construction of agency is particularly interesting in H.Res.344. It starts by emphasising the ÔthreatÕ, to maximise audience acceptance. The emphasis here is on growing Ôglobal demand for oil and natural gasÕ, but the presentation of the global situation lacks mention of agents, leaving the causality of this growing energy consumption unclear. It then moves on to outline ChinaÕs growing energy consumption, highlighting ChinaÕs role as an agent and consumer. While CNOOC is then presented as having some form of independent agency when it Ôannounced its intent to acquire Unocal CorporationÕ, this is immediately revoked in favour of presenting China as the ÔrealÕ agent: Ôthe People's Republic of China owns approximately 70 percent of CNOOCÕ. Increasingly the emphasis is on the ÔChinese governmentÕ, until it moves to conflate CNOOC with the Chinese government; Ôa Chinese Government acquisition of Unocal CorporationÕ. This is accompanied by the presentation of the US as lacking the ability to act as an agent if the merger takes place; Ôbarriers to the ability of the United States Government to enforce export controls and sanctionsÕ. It ends by urging the President to take action, emphasising the exceptional nature of the circumstances. In its construction of agency H. Res. 344 reinforces the idea of Ôthem and usÕ, constructing China as the ÔOtherÕ, using phrases like Ôthe PeopleÕs Republic of China remains strongly committed to national one-party rule by the Communist PartyÕ, setting up China as the opposite of the US, and as the real cause of the threat. Euphemisms are also used to intensify the sense of threat posed by China, most notably the repeated use of the words Ôdual-useÕ. This starts with Ôtechnologies that have Ôdual-useÕ commercial and military applicationsÕ, later adding that if the sale takes place, CNOOC, which has already been equated with China, will have access to Ôsensitive dual-use technologies that the United States would otherwise restrict for export to ChinaÕ. Using the euphemism Ôdual-useÕ allows this threat to be presented without giving more details. As a result, the claim cannot be scrutinised, while the elite status of the securitising actors would provide enough legitimacy to lead most of the audience to accept the claim anyway. The repetition of Ôdual-useÕ in connection with the word ÔmilitaryÕ suggests the threat is important, but too important Ð or ÔsensitiveÕ Ð to give more details. The conclusion of most audience members would likely be: China cannot be trusted with this technology.
Securitising discourse can be seen throughout, in particular in the constant reiteration of the words Ônational securityÕ. The opening sentence sets up the imperative for securitising CNOOCÕs bid; Ôoil and natural gas resources are strategic assets critical to national security and the Nation's economic prosperityÕ. It openly appeals to a very traditional definition of security, ÔnationalÕ and ÔNationÕ emphasising the role of the state. ÔStrategic assetsÕ has clear military connotations, reinforcing this traditional conception of security. ÔCriticalÕ emphasises both the urgency and priority required to justify securitisation. The threat to survival is returned to at the end, where it is declared that if this deal goes forward, it could Ôpose a direct threat to the national security of the United StatesÕ, which is followed by a call for the President to review the deal, going beyond established rules and lifting it above normal politics.
Moving now to the House Armed Services Committee hearing on Ôthe national security implicationsÕ of the CNOOC bid. This analysis focuses on the statement given by Richard DÕAmato, Chairman of the USCC 72 , as the key statement later repeated in the media, though the others will also be discussed in the following section on securitising media representations of the Unocal affair. The securitising effect of the hearing is intensified by the title of the hearing itself, which does not ask if there are national security implications, but rather takes this as undisputable fact. DÕAmatoÕs statement uses persuasive language to convince the audience that securitisation is necessary. His statement warns the committee of the possible implications, acting as a speech-act, and stresses the need to take action. He argues that the US should treat the possible acquisition as Ôa non-commercial transaction with other motives and purposesÕ. The euphemistic use of the negative term Ônon-commercial transactionÕ highlights the exceptionality of the case; it is not a regular commercial transaction. This sentence is linked to national security in the sentence that follows directly after, Ôif it affects the national security of the United States, intervention by the US government must be seriously consideredÕ, endorsing emergency measures. It uses similar euphemistic expressions to H.Res.344, stating that Unocal may possess Ôcertain technologies...that have national security implications and should not be transferred to ChinaÕ. DÕAmato does, however, recognise that the USCC Ôhas not conducted an inquiry on this matterÕ, making it an even more dubious claim. Securitising discourse continues throughout the statement, emphasising the exceptional nature of the threat. There is also clear preoccupation with the role of CNOOCÕs state-ownership as evidenced by extensive overwording used to illustrate this, highlighting it in five separate points. Like in H.Res.344 the Chinese government is seen as the key agent, not CNOOC.
DÕAmatoÕs statement sets the US and China up as binary, constructing China as a threat throughout. China has non-commercial Ômotives and purposesÕ and is Ônot a market economyÕ. Meanwhile, Unocal is described as Ôan American company with American standardsÕ, and US policy as Ôopen markets, to promote energy security for everyoneÕ, as opposed to China. The following simile exemplifies the binary construction of China: Ôthe Chinese treat energy reserves as assets in the same way a 19 th century mercantilist nationstate wouldÕ. DÕAmato continually uses the phrase Ôthe ChineseÕ, constructing them as the ÔOtherÕ and distancing the speaker/writer and listener/reader. This Ôthem and usÕ attitude continues throughout, and in Ôthe taking of an important US energy company by a foreign governmentÕ the word ÔforeignÕ enhances the construction of Ôthe ChineseÕ as Other. Likewise, the use of the word ÔtakingÕ has strategic connotations and glosses over the fact that CNOOC has plainly put forward the highest bid in a commercial transaction. China is said to take a Ôhoarding approachÕ to energy which Ôconflicts with the efforts of the US and other countries in the International Energy Agency to develop fungible, transparent and efficient oil and gas marketsÕ, Here the US is linked to other, positively defined countries, and legitimate organisations like the IEA, while China is in the following section linked to Ôanti-AmericanÕ states with unethical practices including Iran, Sudan (Ôgenocidal practicesÕ), and Venezuela 73 .
US media representations of the Unocal affair also repeatedly securitised the CNOOC bid. This continual repetition and reiteration of the Ônational securityÕ dimensions of the CNOOC bid in both official discourses and the media gradually produced enough momentum for successful securitisation to be possible. The New York Times published a number of articles referring to the Ônational securityÕ aspects of the Unocal bid 74 . In one of these, James Woolsey, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), described CNOOC as the corporate vehicle of Ôa Communist dictatorshipÕ, adding that ÔChina is pursuing a national strategy of domination of the energy marketsÕ 75 . During the Unocal affair, with its repeated elite securitised discourse, one poll showed that Ô73 percent of US nationals disliked the potential dealÕ 78 , suggesting audience acceptance of the securitising discourse. The official discourse served to delimit the discourse possible, and Ôinformation that would have been relevant to a balanced assessment has been conveniently omitted, while other facts have been purposely distorted [sic]Õ 79 .
In contrast, Chinese official discourse attempted to reframe the discourse in economic/market terms. While some of this discourse appears to be desecuritising, it remains rooted in the liberal energy security discourse, with a state-centric, ÔobjectiveÕ understanding of energy security 80 . There is no attempt to move away from viewing energy in national security terms, just to present this particular deal as less threatening. The discourse aimed to allow the deal to go ahead, reducing US political opposition. Various statements from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 81 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC) illustrate this. FMPRC released a statement July 2005 stating that Ô(w)e demand that the U.S. Congress correct its mistaken ways of politicizing economic and trade issues and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countriesÕ 82 . Here the adherence to the liberal, state-centric understanding of energy security is clear. This can also be seen in Chinese media, which reproduced interviews with CNOOC's Chairman Fu Chengyu, stating that Ô(w)e don't believe the deal will hurt the national security of the United StatesÕ 83 . Similar discourse can be found in all the major Chinese newspapers, though all subject to some degree of state censorship. The final attempt was an article by Fu Chengyu which was originally published in The Wall Street Journal on July 6, 2005 and later reproduced by the China Daily. The article was called ÔWhy is America worried?Õ and made a series of commitments including keeping US oil in the US and retaining UnocalÕs US jobs 84 . However, attempts to reframe the debate in liberal/market terms failed to make the deal less threatening and induce cooperation, and on 2 August 2005, CNOOC announced the withdrawal of their bid for Unocal in a press release, citing Ôthe political environment in the USÕ as the key reason 85 . In a sense this failure of Chinese attempts to make cooperation possible by reframing the debate in liberal/market terms could be seen as showing the limits of the liberal cooperation discourse. Without genuinely desecuritising energy, cooperation will remain difficult to achieve in practice.
Policy implications?
Securitisation of the Unocal affair not only made cooperation between China and the US in the case unlikely, if not impossible, but also had long term impact on US-China energy relations. Firstly, on 29 July 2005 the Senate and House both adopted the Pombo amendment to the Energy Policy Act 2005, placing restrictions on sales, requiring a national security review of international energy requirements. It extended the time period for national security reviews in cases of Ôinvestment in the energy assets of a United States domestic corporation by an entity owned or controlled by the government of the PeopleÕs Republic of ChinaÕ 86 to allow both Congress and the President to review reports. Likewise, ChinaÕs National Energy Bureau published a document entitled ÔChina-US Energy Cooperation: Challenges and OpportunitiesÕ in December 2005, which refers directly to the Unocal affair and reflects on the future of US-China energy relations. It states clearly that energy is increasingly becoming an issue of increasing strategic importance in Sino-US relations 87 . The word used for strategic [zhongde zhanlue] has military associations, suggesting it is becoming an issue of strategic importance in a military sense. Referring to Unocal, it highlights the United StatesÕ lack of understanding of China, emphasising the Ôgeopolitical thinkingÕ of US politicians, in particular Congress 88 . Moreover, Unocal had a longer-term impact on the Chinese investment structure, essentially diminishing Chinese investment in the US energy sector for several years -investments only really took off again in 2011-12 89 .
US discourse constructed China as a threat and through gradual processes of securitisation and repeated security speech acts by a range of elite actors CNOOCÕs bid for Unocal was constructed as a critical issue of Ônational securityÕ. As a result, CNOOC withdrew the bid, US legislators amended the Energy Policy Act 2005, and cooperation between the two states was on this issue made effectively impossible. Securitisation of the Unocal affair had clear policy consequences, and discouraged cooperation.
Conventional energy literature understands this case study in simple realist, competition terms as the liberal cooperation literature cannot explain it. It presents both states as acting ÔnaturallyÕ in their own self-interest (to ensure their survival) 90 but fails to explain why energy, often dealt with domestically in policy terms or internationally as a trade matter, in this case was considered a threat to national security requiring state intervention. A securitisation approach can show how a commercial acquisition bid moved from a nonpoliticised market-based issue to an (inter)national security crisis between two superpowers. It allows an analysis of how the threat was constructed and the negative impacts on cooperation, explaining the representation of energy as a policy issue and allowing an analysis of how particular discourse makes particular energy policies possible. Energy security is not inherently geopolitical but inherently constructed, and only by highlighting this constructedness and analysing the process by which threats to energy ÔsecurityÕ come to be understood as threats can we effectively move beyond the Ôenergy securityÕ discourse. The conventional literature fails to acknowledge this. Viewing energy in this very specific national security-framework can constrain the responses available and rendered legitimate. Ultimately, energy high-politics can and should be desecuritised.
Towards desecuritisation of energy
Finally, what prospect might there be for successful reversal of the securitisation of energy in the US-China relationship? This section will not attempt to answer this difficult question comprehensively Ð that would merit an article in itself Ð but it will seek to begin the answering of it, challenging the soundness of opposed arguments focused primarily on a realist critique, by means of brief references to the counterexamples of US-China cooperation on clean energy and on shale gas.
The key critique of the argument put forward here is the realist one. Realist logic would suggest that the Unocal affair demonstrates the natural reaction of one self-interested state to another in an anarchic international system with depleting natural resources. This account 87 would explain American securitisation of the issue as a natural, inevitable consequence of their strategic self-interest Ð rendering it permissible to step outside free trade rules to retain national energy resources Ð and ChinaÕs attempts to reframe the issue as similarly so Ð using the language best suited to allowing the deal to go ahead to ensure their own continued energy supply. If the continuing securitisation of energy is simply an epiphenomenon of inevitable power politics and the need to ensure survival, desecuritisation of energy is unlikely to be possible, and cooperation over energy clearly unlikely.
The Unocal case serves to demonstrate what can happen when discourse is securitisedcooperation was discouraged, bilateral relations damaged and respective directions of the countriesÕ policies affected. Securitisation had a clear impact on policy choices. Yet the choices which resulted from securitisation were not the only ones possible, and in a differently constructed discursive context, different policy might have been eminently possible. To illustrate the possibility of dealing with energy supply issues outside of the security realm, we can examine relevant cases of Sino-American energy cooperation, which show that competition is not an inevitable or natural response; securitisation or politicisation (here taken as synonymous with desecuritisation Ð keeping issues in the realm of normal politics) does have a policy impact. In this case where discourse was not securitised, cooperation was possible.
China and the US in fact cooperate on a range of energy issues, from climate change to energy security, with a US-China Energy Policy dialogue established in 2004 91 . The USChina Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) has been a key development in bilateral cooperation, facilitating Ôjoint research and development on clean energy technology by teams of scientists and engineers from the United States and ChinaÕ 92 . However, those issues generally focused on under the umbrella of this bilateral cooperation are what realists would consider Ôlow politicsÕ, focusing primarily on clean energy initiatives. It could thus be argued that cooperation is possible on less important energy issues, which are not a matter of priority in terms of state survival, while more important issues of Ôhigh politicsÕ cannot. A better example for study may therefore be US-China cooperation on shale gas, an area at the top of ÔhighÕ ÔsecurityÕ politics because of its potential to ease energy supply problems in both states. It is an area where realists would consider competition over technological and physical resources natural, because of the advantage either state could gain internationally from developing successful and effective fracking technologies Ð shale gas, like oil, is a finite resource that can be both used to secure oneÕs own states energy supplies, and/or traded internationally for economic gain.
in 2012, where the need to Ôstrengthen future cooperation concerning shale gas development and regulatory and environmental frameworksÕ was noted 94 .
On the industry level, both CNOOC and Sinopec (another Chinese energy company) have made large investments in US shale in the last few years 95 , and likewise American companies, including Shell and Exxon-mobil, have been working with Chinese companies to develop shale resources in China. Meanwhile, Chinese investment in US shale gas companies has seen none of the securitising rhetoric of the Unocal affair, even giving rise to an article in the Wall Street Journal noting that ÔÉit's incredible that Congress has evinced virtually no interest in Chinese investment in U.S. shale. To anyone who followed the noisily unsuccessful 2005 takeover of Unocal by Cnooc, this is incomprehensibleÕ 96 The article notes UnocalÕs relative lack of importance to US security compared with shale, and follows on to state that despite increasing Chinese investments in US shale Ôthere have been no debates, no resolutions and no angry rhetoricÕ 97 .
In contrast to Unocal affair, when it comes to shale bilateral energy relations are discussed not in national security terms, but largely in economic, technological and environmental terms. Indeed there is a particular focus on the environmental impacts of fracking and how the two countries can jointly regulate this to minimise damage. Indeed, the shale gas initiative is said to aim Ôto increase bilateral collaboration on regulations and technology development of shale gas reserves while also protecting the environment and communities around such exploration in both countriesÕ 98 . The discourse surrounding cooperation on shale gas stands in stark contrast to the discourse of the Unocal affair. Rather than national security, the focus is on mutual interests and opportunities for collaboration, with particular care taken when it comes to dealing with environmental impacts on a local and international level, both in terms of fracking, and impacts on climate change.
Clearly this example requires deeper research and lengthier discussion than is possible here in order to establish the dynamics at work in enabling the functioning of cooperation on shale gas. Nevertheless, shale gas cooperation between China and the US represents prima facie evidence that close cooperation is possible even on an area of energy policy with implications for core questions of national survival. It also shows that even Ôhigh politicsÕ energy issues can be politicised, and framed in economic and environmental terms. As such, securitisation of energy is not a necessity, nor ÔnaturalÕ or ÔinevitableÕ. While this case can be seen as an example of the conventional ÔcooperationÕ approach to energy, the existing literature cannot explain why the responses to the Unocal affair and Chinese shale investment were different, why one case necessarily led to a strategic, realist response and the other allowed a cooperative, integrative response. 94 While this article illustrates that in the case of the Unocal affair, successful securitisation of energy enabled different policy choices than a desecuritised approach, it is difficult to determine why securitisation occurred in the Unocal case, but not with shale gas. The Copenhagen School would argue that securitisation is always a Ôpolitical choiceÕ 99 -and a number of external, contextual factors are likely to have impacted on this choice which makes it difficult to speculate. One key factor may be the timing of the Unocal affair Ð as noted earlier it occurred during a period of particularly high tension in US-China relations. Meanwhile, there are some differences between oil and shale, with less evidence of Ôpeak shaleÕ, and more open market trade on oil, which may lead to shale deals being considered less dangerous. It could also be argued that US assistance in developing Chinese shale supplies desecuritises energy politics by increasing the amount of energy available 100 . Likewise, as mentioned previously there are competing discourses in the US advancing different perspectives on energy security, and a number of contextual factors may have been at work to make liberal/market discourses more likely in the shale case. However, it is vital to note that realist/strategic voices remain very active in Congress, as can be seen in the recent CNOOC-Nexen case 101 . Ultimately, much more research is needed to fully determine why securitisation of energy is successful in some cases but not others.
Problematically, there is a lack of research on desecuritisation in practice. However, this short discussion shows that energy does not have to be dealt with in securitised terms 102 . Moreover, doing so has a negative effect both on security in traditional, state-centric terms by making zero-sum outcomes more likely, and in non-traditional security terms because of the impact of securitised energy policy on individuals and the environment. Desecuritising energy would open up more policy options, avoid zero-sum outcomes and make transnational cooperation on energy issues more likely. This may in turn make possible policies that have a less negative impact on individuals and the environment, as can be seen in the case of shale gas cooperation. It is, however, likely to be difficult and much more research is needed on this.
Conclusion
Energy is becoming increasingly important in US-China relations and is often identified as a potential area of conflict, and thus the construction of energy as a security issue has particularly important implications for US-China relations. This paper has presented a case study showing the effects of securitisation on energy policy, but it is only one case and much more research is needed. While it cannot be used to generalise, it clearly illustrates some limits of the traditional energy ÔsecurityÕ literature, showing potential and scope for further research. Another crucial area for future research is desecuritisation in practice. This paper has attempted to highlight an ontological and normative critique of the current energy ÔsecurityÕ literature. To tackle these limits it has advocated using a securitisation approach to energy policy to emphasise the problems inherent in securitising energy, which has been ignored by the dominant approaches. The Unocal affair has been used to illustrate this in practice, showing the policy implications of securitising energy, the role of states in constructing threats, and the implications of dealing with energy in the security realm. The cases of US-China cooperation on clean energy and shale gas were used to show the possibility of dealing with energy in economic and/or environmental terms, moving it out of the security realm. While not discussed in detail, desecuritisation of energy has been advocated as a path to future energy cooperation.
The current energy ÔsecurityÕ dynamic focuses on state security. While this is not problematic in itself, in practice it works to drive up competition for energy resources and has a negative impact on both the environment and human security. It leads to fluctuating and rising oil prices, affecting economic stability in an already fragile global economy. Securitisation theory can explain the representation of energy as a policy issue to allow an analysis of how particular policy is made possible through the use of particular discourse, while silencing alternative policy options. This is largely neglected in the current literature on energy security, which does not recognise the implications of the very particular securitised discourse it uses to represent energy which in practice works to limit the range of policy options and make zero-sum outcomes more likely. It also provides an alternative to the current security-focused discourse. This has clear implications for energy policy-making. Ultimately, energy would undoubtedly benefit from being moved out of the Ôhigh politicsÕ state-centric security realm, to move beyond the current discourse and allow for the emergence of a new, less narrow, energy policy/practice.
